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ABSTRACT
Latin America had the highest tariffs in the world before 1914; Asia had
the lowest. Heavily protected Latin America also boasted some of the most
explosive belle e´poque growth, while open Asia registered some of the least.
What brought the two regions to the opposite ends of the tariff policy spectrum?
We find that limits to Asian tariff policy autonomy may have lowered tariffs
substantially there, but by themselves they cannot explain why Asian tariffs
were so much lower than the Latin American tariffs before 1914; that natural
barriers, domestic political economy and strategic tariff policy seems to have
contributed much to the difference and that the origins of Asian post-World
War 2 import-substitution policies seem to lie in the interwar years when Asian
tariff levels caught up with those of Latin America.
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RESUMEN
Ame´rica Latina tuvo los aranceles ma´s altos del mundo antes de 1914;
Asia tuvo los ma´s bajos. Fuertemente protegida, Ame´rica Latina tambie´n
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ofrecio´ uno de los crecimientos ma´s explosivos de la belle e´poque mientras
Asia mostraba uno de los menores. +Fue el diferente espectro de la polı´tica
arancelaria lo que llevo´ a estas dos regiones a destinos tan opuestos? Nosotros
encontramos: que los lı´mites a la autonomı´a de la polı´tica arancelaria en Asia
habrı´an contribuido considerablemente a reducir los aranceles, pero no pue-
den explicar por sı´ mismos por que´ los aranceles fueron mucho ma´s bajos que
en Ame´rica Latina antes de 1914; las barreras naturales, la economı´a polı´tica
nacional y las polı´ticas arancelarias estrate´gicas parecen haber contribuido
mucho a la diferencia en el comportamiento del crecimiento de estas dos zonas
y los orı´genes de la polı´tica de sustitucio´n de importaciones asia´tica posterior a
la II Guerra Mundial parecen extenderse al periodo de entreguerras cuando los
niveles arancelarios asia´ticos convergieron con los de Ame´rica Latina.
Palabras clave: aranceles, Ame´rica Latina, Asia, crecimiento, historia
1. INTRODUCTION
While many have compared Latin American and Asian trade policy since
1950, few have extended the comparison to the preceding century. The best
evidence from the long 19th century through World War (WW) 2 reveals
tremendous contrasts between the two regions. These demand explanation.
Latin America had the highest tariffs in the world before 1914; Asia had
the lowest. The Latin American belle e´poque also boasted some of the highest
growth rates, while Asia registered some of the lowest. What brought the two
regions to the opposite ends of the tariff policy spectrum? Was it simply that
Latin America had policy autonomy, while most of colonial Asia did not, or
was the political economy of tariffs more complex? Why did Asian tariffs
catch up with those high Latin American tariffs in the 1920s and 1930s? Do
historical patterns of growth and tariff policy in the two regions accord with
recent conventional wisdom that free trade fosters growth?
This paper uses the historical record of tariff policy to begin an
exploration of all of these questions. We use average ad valorem-equivalent
tariff rates and describe their correlates with tariff autonomy and other
political economy forces in the two regions. Average tariff rates cannot, of
course, settle questions about «protection» more generally, which includes
policies other than tariffs, and they lack fine-grained information about
relative protection of different industries. Since overall tariffs differed vastly
between the two regions, they are certainly a good place to begin.
We first describe our tariff database. We use these data to explore the partial
correlations between import duty levels and the conditions under which they
were set — including colonial rule, «unequal treaties», world market condi-
tions, geography and the local political economy environments. We find that
while limits to Asian tariff policy autonomy certainly lowered tariffs there
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substantially, they cannot by themselves explain why Asian tariffs were so
much lower than the Latin American tariffs before 1914; that natural barriers,
domestic political economy and strategic tariff policy seem to have contributed
much to the difference and that the origins of Asian post-WW2 import-sub-
stitution policies seem to lie in the interwar years when Asian tariffs caught up
with those of Latin America. At the end of the paper, we pose a research
agenda: Does tariff policy explain most of the differences in industrialisation
experience within and between the two regions, or did other factors — like
terms of trade trends, the evolution of wage, fuel, and intermediate costs and
productivity catch up with the leaders — matter much more?
2. THE TARIFF DATA
A well-developed international literature makes it clear that trade shares
are very poor measures of openness, since they are endogenous and can be
driven by demand and supply factors within countries that are completely
independent of trade policy1. Among the explicit policy measures of openness
available, the average tariff rate is by far the most homogeneous protection
measure and the easiest to collect across countries and over time. We are, of
course, aware that countries can have the same average tariff levels, but very
different tariff structures2. Nevertheless, high average tariffs typically meant
even higher tariffs on manufactures in primary-product exporting countries3.
We are also aware that by the late 1930s every country had learnt how to use
non-tariff barriers (NTBs), especially the manipulation of the real exchange
rate to favour import-competing industries. However, NTBs were not used
very frequently before the early 1930s, and nearly every country was on a fixed
exchange standard before WW1 and again in the 1920s. In short, tariffs were
the main instrument of trade policy before the 1930s. In any case, high tariffs
were also positively correlated with the use of NTBs. Thus, it seems to us that
1 For example, see Anderson and Neary (1994), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Anderson (1998).
Indeed, it appears that totally 67 per cent of the late 20th century Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development trade boom can be explained by unusually fast income growth, and
not by the decline in trade barriers (Baier and Bergstrand 2001). To cite another example, 50 to 65
per cent of the European overseas trade boom in the three centuries following 1492 were driven by
income growth, rather than by any decline in trade barriers (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002,
p. 439). As a final example, 57 per cent of the world trade boom from 1870 to 1913 was explained by
the income growth (Estevadeordal et al. 2003, Table III).
2 See, for example, Lehmann and O’Rourke (2011) on 19th century Europe, and Nunn and
Trefler (2010) on the 20th century world economy.
3 See, for example, Bairoch (1993) and Williamson (2011a, Ch. 13). Antonio Ten˜a (personal
correspondence) has estimated ad valorem tariffs on British manufacturing exports for four Latin
American republics in 1914 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico): while the tariff for all imports
averaged 21.5 per cent, the average tariff on British manufactures averaged 45 per cent, more than
twice as high. Similarly, for the European periphery (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Spain): while
the average tariff on all imports in 1914 was 18.4 per cent, the tariff on British manufactures was
46.2 per cent, almost three times higher.
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as an overall measure of protection, average tariffs are the place to start any
empirical analysis of the political economy of protection, even if they are not
the place to finish it. In addition, while high tariffs may not necessarily be the
result of explicit pro-industrialisation goals, they are protectionist regardless
of their motivation.
This paper uses the computed average tariff rate to explore differences
between Asian and Latin American policy experience from shortly after the mid-
19th century to WW2. Our country observations from these two regions are part
of a larger world sample of thirty-five, extending up to 1950: the United States;
three members of the European industrial core (France, Germany and the United
Kingdom); three English-speaking European offshoots (Australia, Canada and
New Zealand); ten from the European periphery (Austria–Hungary, Denmark,
Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain and Sweden); ten from
Asia and the Middle East (Burma, Ceylon, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan,
the Philippines, Siam (Thailand) and the Ottoman Empire (republican Turkey));
and eight from Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Colombia, Mexico,
Peru and Uruguay). Standard tariff histories focus mainly on seven — Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
While the tariff data used here have already been exploited to help redress this
big world research imbalance (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002; Clemens and
Williamson 2004; Coatsworth and Williamson 2004a, 2004b; Williamson 2006b),
this paper does much more by focusing in depth on the ten Asian and eight Latin
American countries in our sample, which represent the poor periphery, and by
exploring the crucial interwar experience as well.
Average tariff rates are calculated as the total revenue from import duties
divided by the value of total imports in the same year. In some cases, the
sources used do not distinguish between import and export duties, and report
only total customs duties. However, total customs duties (instead of import
duties) are used in the calculation of average tariff rates only for countries
where the value of export duties have historically been an insignificant share
of total customs duties. Sometimes, the value of import duties collected is
reported for fiscal years, while import data generally refer to calendar years.
While making a consistent effort to compare calendar year duties with
calendar year import values, in cases where calendar year duties figures are
unavailable, fiscal year duties are divided by calendar year imports to calculate
average tariff. In these instances, fiscal year import duties are assumed to
belong to the calendar year in which most of the fiscal year falls4.
The remainder of this paper defines Latin America as the eight-country
sample consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru
and Uruguay. Asia is defined as the ten-country sample consisting of Burma,
China, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Siam and
4 A complete appendix description of the sources and methods surrounding the tariff database
can be found in Blattman et al. (2002) and Clemens and Williamson (2004).
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Turkey, while East Asia is defined by the sub-sample of China, Indonesia,
Japan, the Philippines and Siam.
3. EXPLORING TARIFF AUTONOMY
Our analysis requires formalisation of the concept of tariff autonomy, the
freedom to set tariff levels independent of another state’s military and poli-
tical power. Table 1 lists the years in which we judge each country to have
had tariff autonomy. Burma, Ceylon and India were subject to British
imperial tariff collection policies, as Cuba was to the Spanish through 1899,
Indonesia (Netherlands Indies) was to the Dutch and the Philippines was to
both the Spanish up to 1898 and the United States thereafter. The British
Foreign Office in China largely eliminated the tariff restrictions imposed by
the treaties of Nanking and Tientsin in 1929. Norway did not have an inde-
pendent tariff policy under the Swedish crown through 1905. Gradual weak-
ening of Ottoman control in Serbia is construed to imply tariff autonomy
following the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. Egypt is taken to hold tariff autonomy
under non-interventionist Ottoman rule during the years prior to the British
invasion of 1882, but not thereafter. Thailand is taken to recover autonomy
from the grasp of the unequal treaties in 1891, following Ingram (1971,
p. 138), and Japan in 1900, following Lockwood (1968, p. 539). We take
Turkey to have lost tariff autonomy in the brief years between its defeat in
WW1 and Mustafa Kemal’s establishment of the Turkish Republic thereafter.
With these definitions of tariff autonomy in mind, we turn next to colonial
tariff policy, followed by tariff policy under gunboat diplomacy.
3.1. Did Asian Colonies Simply Mimic their Masters?
This is a good place to explore the tariff autonomy issue within the
colonies. There are five colonies in our sample, all in Asia: Burma, Ceylon,
India, Indonesia and the Philippines, although foreign influence was strong
enough (including occupation) to make Egypt behave like a colony after 1881
(see, e.g. Owen 1993, p. 122). To what extent did these six simply mimic their
colonial masters?
Figure 1 reveals a clear correlation in timing and magnitudes of change in
tariff rates between the United Kingdom and her four colonies in the sample
(Burma, Ceylon, Egypt and India). Figure 2 shows the same for the Philippines,
first for Spain and then for the United States (becoming the imperialist master
in 1899). Table 2 reports the master colony tariff rate correlations for these four
and for the Philippines5. Colonial tariff policy did indeed mimic that of the
5 The Netherlands is not part of our sample, and thus we cannot explore the same correlations
between it and Indonesia.
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TABLE 1
TARIFF AUTONOMY 1870-1938
Over the years spanning from 1870 to 1938, the periods during which countries are
deemed to have autonomy over setting tariff rates were (see text):
Argentina All
Australia All
Austria/Austria–Hungary All
Brazil All
Burma None
Canada All
Ceylon None
Chile All
China 1929 and after
Colombia All
Cuba 1899 and after
Denmark All
Egypt Before 1882
France All
Germany All except 1919-1925
Greece All
India None
Indonesia None
Italy All
Japan 1900 and after
Mexico All
New Zealand All
Norway 1906 and after
Peru All
Philippines None
Portugal All
Russia/USSR All
Serbia/Yugoslavia 1878 and after
Spain All
Sweden All
Thailand 1891 and after
Turkey All except 1919-1923
United Kingdom All
United States All
Uruguay All
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FIGURE 1
BRITISH TARIFFS VS. TARIFFS IN THE EMPIRE
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FIGURE 2
FILIPINO TARIFFS VS. SPANISH AND AMERICAN TARIFFS
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masters: although Spain failed to imprint its tariff rates on the Philippines
before 1899 (Figure 2), the United States did afterwards, and Britain did so
across all four of its Asian colonies in our sample (Figure 1). Furthermore, the
t-statistics are very large, and the slope coefficients are similar across masters
and colonies, ranging approximately between 0.5 and 0.9.
However, note the variance across these four at any point in time (Figure 1),
and note the country-specific variance in the intercepts reported for the five in
Table 2. The Philippine tariff rates were on average approximately two points
below the United States after 1898; and compared with Britain, India’s tariff
rates were approximately the same, Burma and Ceylon were four or five points
higher, and Egypt’s were ten points higher. Clearly, local conditions mattered
even in colonies. Thus, we retain the full Asian sample in all that follows,
although we will control for the tariff policy of the masters.
There are three surprises that emerge from this section. First, tariff policy
correlates with local conditions even in the colonies. For example, in the
1930s tariff rates ranged between 9.9 per cent in the Philippines and 28.7 per cent
TABLE 2
CORRELATION BETWEEN TARIFFS IN COLONIES AND THEIR COLONIAL
MASTERS
Country’s tariff as
dependent variance Egypt Burma Ceylon India Philippines Philippines
Time period
1865-
1945
1865-
1945
1865-
1945
1865-
1945 1865-1898 1899-1945
UK tariffs 0.607 0.672 0.493 0.893
6.65 8.62 17.5 16.5
0.587 0.685 0.886 0.874
Spain tariffs 20.0807
20.456
20.0791
USA tariffs 0.870
10.2
0.839
Constant 10.0 4.84 4.32 0.198 11.4 22.16
7.51 4.25 10.5 0.249 3.49 21.47
N 86 86 86 86 35 46
R2 0.345 0.469 0.785 0.763 0.00630 0.704
Note: Ordinary least squares regressions. t-statistics are in italics and standardized coefficients are in
bold below each coefficient.
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in Burma. Second, the colonies in Asia had higher tariffs than the «inde-
pendents» elsewhere in Asia throughout the eighty years following 1870. For
example, if we exclude Egypt and Turkey, in the 1890s Asian colonies had 7.1
per cent tariff rates, while Asian «independents» had 3.8 per cent; in the 1930s,
colonies had 19.3 per cent tariff rates, while «independents» had 17.3 per cent
(see also Figure 3). Third, tariffs rose to high levels everywhere in Asia during
the 1930s, including the colonies. Indeed, the literature has not appreciated
that by the end of the 1930s tariffs in Asia were as high as they were in Latin
America (Figure 4). This was long before the post-WW2 independence moves
to de-link from world markets by policies of import substitution.
3.2. Gunboat Diplomacy and the Asian «Independents»
Independence did not necessarily mean tariff autonomy. Although our
focus in this paper is tariff experience after the 1860s, we must start a couple
of decades earlier to deal with the issue of Asian tariff autonomy.
Transport costs dropped very fast before WW1, accounting for approxi-
mately two-thirds of the integration of world commodity markets over the
century following 1820, and for all of world commodity market integration in
the four decades after 1870, when globalisation backlash offset some of it
FIGURE 3
AVERAGE AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF TARIFF LEVELS: COLONIES VS.
NON-COLONIES IN ASIA
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(see Lindert and Williamson 2002; Williamson 2006a, Ch. 3, 2011a, Ch. 2).
This political backlash was absent in Asia, partly because of the political
influence wielded by native elites who appear to have had at least some
control over the natural resources that were the base of their exports, partly
because many of the colonialists were free traders, and partly because many
Asian «independents» were persuaded to go open and stay open by gunboat
diplomacy. As a result, commodity price convergence and trade creation
between Europe and Asia were even more dramatic than within the Atlantic
economy as shown by O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) and in greater detail
by Williamson (2002, 2006a, 2011a) alone.
While the fall in transport costs was dramatic, it was not the greatest
globalisation event affecting 19th century Asia. Under the duress of Com-
modore Perry’s American gun ships, Japan signed the Shimoda and Harris
treaties and in doing so switched from autarky to free trade in 1858 (see the
excellent surveys in Howe 1996, Ch. 30; Bernhofen and Brown 2004, 2005). It
is hard to imagine a more dramatic switch in trade policy since Japan’s
foreign trade quickly rose from nil to 7 per cent of national income6, and its
terms of trade improved by a factor of 3.5 times, according to Huber (1971),
or 4.9 times, according to Yasuba (1996). Lockwood (1968, pp. 18-19)
documents that between 1866 and 1895 the «unequal treaties» continued to
limit Japanese tariffs to 5 per cent ad valorem. Japan regained tariff auton-
omy in 1899, but «[e]ven the recovery of tariff autonomy in the nineties still
FIGURE 4
REGIONAL AVERAGE AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF TARIFF LEVELS:
LATIN AMERICA VS. ASIA
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6 This rise is computed over the fifteen years following 1858 (Huber 1971).
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left treaty restrictions on the duties applying to many items. Rates were
generally no higher than 10-15 per cent until the general tariff revision of
1911» (Lockwood 1968, p. 539).
Other Asian nations followed the same liberal path, most forced to do so
by colonial dominance or gunboat diplomacy. Thus, and even before the
Japanese humiliation, China signed a treaty with Britain in 1842 that opened
her ports to trade. The treaties of Nanking (1843), Tientsin (1858) and others
like them, limited the Chinese ad valorem tariff rate on imports from
essentially all of Europe to 5 per cent. In fact, the treaties (and their revisions
in 1870, 1902 and 1922) did not set ad valorem rates but rather nominal
specific duties that, although initially equivalent to a 5 per cent ad valorem tariff,
rapidly declined in effective value as prices rose (Remer 1926, pp. 171-181).
Siam avoided China’s humiliation by going open on its own and adopting a 3
per cent tariff limit in 1855. Between 1865 and 1890, treaties with all the major
powers kept import duties below 3 per cent in Siam. Only after 1890 did Siam
begin to revise the earlier treaties and increase tariff revenue by raising its tariff
rates (Ingram 1971, pp. 34-35, 138). Korea emerged from being the autarkic
Hermit Kingdom about the same time, undergoing market integration with
Japan long before colonial status became formalised in 1910 (Brandt 1993;
Kang and Cha 1996). India went the way of British free trade in 1846, and
Indonesia followed Dutch liberalism. Thus, and in sharp contrast with Europe
(and its hostile grain invasion response) and Latin America (and its even more
hostile manufactures invasion response), sharply declining transport costs were
not offset in Asia by a rise in tariffs.
4. SOME LATIN AMERICAN BELLE E´POQUE SURPRISES
Coatsworth and one of the present authors (Coatsworth and Williamson
2004a, 2004b) recently uncovered some facts that had not been well appre-
ciated: Tariffs in Latin America were far higher than anywhere else in the
world during the decades before WW1. This was long before the Great
Depression, after which the region retreated into what became known as
Import Substituting Industrialisation (ISI). Indeed, tariffs were even rising in
the decades before 1914, a period that has been identified by O’Rourke and
Williamson (1999) the first globalisation boom for the world economy. This
fact is surprising, and for three reasons: first, it comes as a surprise given that
this region has been said to have exploited globalisation forces better than
most of the poor periphery during the pre-1914 belle e´poque (Bulmer-Thomas
1994, Ch. 4); second, it comes as a surprise since standard economic histories
say so little about it7; and third, it comes as a surprise since most have always
been taught to view the Great Depression as the critical turning point when
7 See Go´mez Galvarriato and Williamson (2009) for one recent exception to this generalization.
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the region is said to have turned towards protection and de-linked from the
world economy for the first time (for three often cited examples, see Diaz-
Alejandro 1984; Corbo 1992; Taylor 1998).
These Latin American surprises can be seen in Figure 4, but they can be
appreciated even better by comparisons with the rest of the world. As we
noted above, conventional wisdom is that Latin American reluctance to go
open in the mid-late 20th century was the product of the Great Depression
and the anti-global import-substitution strategies that arose to deal with it.
Yet, late 19th century Latin America already had by far the highest tariffs in
the world. For example, in 1885 the poor but independent parts of Latin
America (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) had tariffs almost five times
higher than those in the poor and dependent parts of Asia (Burma, Ceylon,
China, Egypt, India, Indonesia and the Philippines). Perhaps more to the
point, in the decades before 1914 tariffs in Latin America were, on average,
five times higher than those in the European industrial core of Britain,
France and Germany!
At the crescendo of the belle e´poque, Latin American tariffs were at their
peak, and still far above tariffs in the rest of the world. For example, in 1905
tariffs in Uruguay (the most protectionist, land-abundant and labour-scarce
country) were approximately two and a half times those in Canada (the least
protectionist, land-abundant and labour-scarce country). In the same year,
tariffs in Brazil and Colombia (the most protectionist Latin American
countries) were almost ten times those in China and India (the least pro-
tectionist in Asia). Furthermore, the rise in Latin American tariffs from the
late 1860s to the turn of the century was much steeper than was true of
Europe, including France and Germany about which so much tariff history
has been written by scholars like Gerschenkron (1943), Kindleberger (1951),
Bairoch (1989) and, more recently, O’Rourke (2000). For example, the rise in
the average tariff rate between the 1870s and the 1890s was 5.7 percentage
points in France, up from 4.4 per cent to still only 10.1 per cent, and
5.3 percentage points in Germany, up from 3.8 to still only 9.1 per cent. This
heavily researched continental move to protection is pretty modest when
compared with the rise over the same period in the four poor Latin American
countries (up from 6.9 percentage points to 34 per cent), and this for a region
that has been said to have exploited the pre-1914 globalisation boom so well
by allowing exports to be an engine of growth.
5. CLOSED JAGUAR, OPEN DRAGON?
Figure 4 reveals the stark difference between Latin American and Asian
tariff policy that persisted over the century between the 1860s and the eve of
the WW2. Black lines show regional means, while grey bands indicate one
(regional) standard deviation above and below that mean.
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Note the collapse in tariff rates across WW1, a worldwide phenomenon due
to the tendency for wartime inflation to erode the ad valorem equivalent of
what were largely specific duties, not principally the result of tariff policy
changes. The inflation-induced wartime fall was partially recovered in the post-
war deflations of the late 1910s and early 1920s. Note also that the tariff rate
surged in the early 1930s, spiking in 1933, again repeated across the globe, as
world price levels collapsed, raising the ad valorem equivalent of those specific
duties, not the result of tariff policy changes. However, both Latin American
and Asian tariff rates continued to rise after the world recovery and price rise:
indeed, they rose more in Asia, reaching parity with and even exceeding pro-
tectionist Latin America 1934-1939. Of course, tariff rates were raised partly in
response to America’s Hawley–Smoot Act; however, the main point is that tariff
rates rose to high levels in Asia and Latin America even after prices began to
inflate during the recovery from the Great Depression.
The impact of inflation and deflation on ad valorem tariff rate equivalents
was huge in Asia and Latin America since the poor periphery relied so
heavily on specific duties (e.g. pesos per pound, francs per bale, dollars per
yard). Why were (and are) specific duties so common in poor parts of the
world? There are two possible explanations. First, honest and literate cus-
toms inspectors are scarce in poor countries, but honest and literate customs
inspectors are needed to implement an ad valorem tariff where import
valuation is so crucial. So, legislators imposed specific duties to minimise the
«theft» of state tariff revenues by dishonest and illiterate customs agents.
Second, specific duties are more effective macro-stabilisation devices in
poor countries that rely so heavily on customs duties as a source of total
government revenue. During booms, prices rise, lowering the effective
tariff rates from specific duties, thus tending to mute the boom in tariff
revenues generated by the boom in import demand. During slumps, prices
fall, raising effective tariff rates, thus tending to offset the fall in tariff rev-
enues generated by the slump in import demand. These macro-stabilisation
forces would be all the more valuable in pre-WW2 Latin America and
Asia when both regions were susceptible to great price volatility in their
commodity export markets8.
Table 3 summarises the variance in tariff rates before 1914. The average
Latin American country had four times the tariff level of the average Asian
country. Table 4 gives average tariffs for each country during three different
time periods (1870-1899, 1900-1913 and 1919-1938). Setting aside for a
moment the relatively high tariffs of the Philippines, every Asian country had
lower tariffs than every Latin country before 1914. That was not true after
WW1, however, when three Asian countries nudged their tariff rates up in to
8 The literature on commodity price volatility and its impact is very large. See, for example,
Blattman et al. (2002, 2007), Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2007), Jacks et al. (2011), Williamson
(2011a, Ch. 10) and van der Ploeg (2011).
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Latin American ranges (Burma, Egypt, Turkey). Moreover, to repeat, by the
late 1930s Asia on average had higher tariffs than Latin America.
Figure 5 presents cross-sectional unweighted average GDP per capita, in
1990 US$, for the two regions. Despite variation within the sample and inter-
war troubles, the big morals of Figure 5 are that Latin America started from a
far richer resource base and thus a much higher per capita income; her belle
e´poque growth experience left Asia far behind, but the GDP per capita gap
between Latin America and Asia stopped widening in the interwar decades.
Were high tariffs associated with fast growth? Latin America had enormous
tariffs and an impressive growth performance, while Asia had low tariffs and
slow growth. However, Figure 6 shows that within these two regions, high
tariffs are correlated with slow growth. So it looks like third forces might
account for the regional growth differences. Future research might do well to
explore this issue at greater length by looking at industrialisation and third
factors, a point we will raise again at the end of this paper.
6. WHY WERE LATIN AMERICAN TARIFFS SO MUCH HIGHER
THAN ASIAN TARIFFS BEFORE WW1?
Table 5 seeks to determine some of the correlates of the vastly different
tariff levels between Latin America and Asia before 1914. It certainly does
TABLE 3
REGIONAL SUMMARY OF TARIFF LEVELS, 1870-1913
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Observations
Latin America1
Overall 27.0 8.76 9.7 58.2 N5341
Between 6.84 Groups58
Within 6.04 T543
Asia2
Overall 7.04 4.29 1.78 23.5 N5440
Between 3.43 Groups5 10
Within 2.79 T544
East Asia3
Overall 6.70 4.80 1.78 23.5 N5220
Between 4.13 Groups55
Within 3.05 T544
1Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.
2Burma, China, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Siam and Turkey.
3China, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines and Siam.
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not estimate a well-specified reduced-form model of the determinants of
tariffs, so the coefficients estimated there cannot be given a simple causal
interpretation. Large coefficients can represent the influence of reverse
causation or the influence of omitted factors; small coefficients can reflect
overlapping and countervailing effects. Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed
that corroboration of theory advances the scientific enterprise even when
strict hypothesis testing is difficult, as it certainly is in this setting.
Table 5 explores cross-sectional differences in country tariffs for all thirty-
five countries in the world sample, not just those in Asia and Latin America.
These regressions use a panel between effects estimator, since the relation-
ships we seek are cross-sectional — Latin America vs. Asia. The first three
columns address the fact that coverage of the inflation regressor in our
database is limited to thirty of the thirty-five countries. The first column thus
analyses the full sample; the second column includes the same regressors,
but restricts the sample to data points for which inflation is not missing; and
TABLE 4
AVERAGE TARIFF LEVELS BY PERIOD 1870-1938
1870-1899 1900-1913 1919-1938
Argentina 26.1 23.4 18.0
Brazil 34.5 40.0 23.4
Chile 19.4 18.3 22.1
Colombia 33.5 47.4 29.3
Cuba 22.5 25.6 26.2
Mexico 16.6 21.9 21.2
Peru 32.4 23.2 16.3
Uruguay 29.7 33.3 19.6
China 3.2 3.3 11.3
Indonesia 4.9 5.2 10.0
Japan 6.2 7.7 5.9
Philippines 10.3 21.2 8.1
Siam 3.6 7.4 15.1
Burma 4.0 11.3 22.5
Ceylon 6.2 7.3 13.3
Egypt 11.0 14.2 26.3
India 3.4 4.7 17.3
Turkey 7.4 9.5 30.7
Note: Tariffs are expressed as total import duties collected divided by total imports (%).
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FIGURE 5
REGIONAL AVERAGE AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF GDP/CAPITA: LATIN
AMERICA VS. ASIA
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THE TARIFF-GROWTH CORRELATION IN THE YEARS BEFORE WORLD WAR 1
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TABLE 5
WHY WERE TARIFFS HIGHER IN LATIN AMERICA THAN IN ASIA BEFORE WORLD WAR 1?
Dependent variable: ln(Own Tariff1)
Sample: 35 countries2, 1870-1913
Panel between effects estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Exports/GDP) 20.398 20.195 20.384 20.410
(1.68) (0.92) (1.60) (1.62)
ln(GDP/capita3) 20.421 20.524 20.506 20.533
(1.44) (1.71) (1.79)* (1.82)*
ln(Population) 20.477 20.430 20.612 20.384 20.605 20.359
(3.27)*** (3.13)*** (3.65)*** (4.17)*** (3.41)*** (3.74)***
ln(Partner Tariff4) 0.436 0.505 0.445 0.407 0.438 0.397
(2.31)** (2.56)** (2.38)** (2.11)** (2.21)** (1.94)*
ln(Effective Dist5) 0.086 0.141 20.059 0.029 20.092 0.001
(0.98) (1.44) (0.47) (0.25) (0.70) (0.01)
ln(Railway Miles6) 0.190 0.141 0.386 0.227 0.388 0.219
(2.06)* (1.70) (2.73)** (2.16)** (2.60)** (1.97)*
ln(Schooling7) 20.117 0.097 20.264 20.037 20.475 20.244
(0.70) (0.53) (1.08) (0.18) (2.08)* (1.32)
ln(Urbanization8) 0.174 0.082 0.292 0.138 0.239 0.070
(1.18) (0.53) (1.67) (0.91) (1.32) (0.45)
Tariff autonomy9 0.760 0.618 0.912 0.795 0.843 0.713
(2.61)** (2.10)** (2.84)** (2.44)** (2.50)** (2.10)**
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TABLE 5 (Cont.)
Dependent variable: ln(Own Tariff1)
Sample: 35 countries2, 1870-1913
Panel between effects estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflation 20.030 0.034 20.037 0.030
(0.39) (0.50) (0.47) (0.43)
Inflation squared 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(2.10)* (1.43) (2.07)* (1.39)
Constant 5.435 4.989 7.030 5.870 5.261 3.918
(3.14)*** (2.92)*** (3.83)*** (3.34)*** (3.22)*** (2.67)**
Observations 1,528 1,174 1,174 1,174 1,174 1,174
No. of countries 35 30 30 30 30 30
R2 0.655 0.717 0.784 0.753 0.745 0.710
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics is in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
1Import duties over imports.
2Argentina, Australia, Austria-Hungary, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States and Uruguay.
3In 1990 US$.
4Index of average tariff levels in top five trading partners weighted by exports going to that partner.
5Product of average physical distance to top five trading partners (principal city to principal city) weighted by exports going to that country, and
transportation cost index.
6Miles of railway trunk line in country.
7Fraction of the population below the age of fifteen that is enrolled in primary school.
8Fraction of the population living in agglomerations of greater than 50,000 people.
9Indicator variable taking the value 1 if country has the freedom to set own tariff levels independently, or 0 if it does not.
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the third column includes inflation. Below, we discuss the last three columns —
which reflect an admittedly imperfect effort to approximate the magnitude of
endogeneity in the model.
What do we expect? There is no well-specified causal model of funda-
mental tariff determinants in this period (or others). We use the available
data to investigate whether they corroborate broad classes of theories, in
order to motivate the development of better theories and better empirics.
Table 5 right-hand side variables, suggested by previous work of the authors
with others (Blattman et al. 2002, 2007; Coatsworth and Williamson 2004a,
2004b; Williamson 2006b), are the following (all but dummies in logs)9:
> Export share: suppose that governments set tariffs to maximise
revenue. This export/GDP ratio is a measure of export boom, where we
expect booms in the previous year to diminish the need for high tariff
rates this year, thus suggesting negative coefficients in the regression10.
> GDP per capita and Schooling: the latter the primary school enrolment
rate. Suppose that governments set tariffs to protect local manufacture of
products requiring skilled labour. These variables are taken as proxies for
skill endowments, with the expectation that the more abundant the skills,
the more competitive the industrial sector, and the less the need for
protection — at least in Latin America and Asia where manufacturing
was import competing. This suggests a negative coefficient in the
regression.
> Population: suppose that governments choose tax instruments to meet
a certain revenue target. Large countries have bigger domestic markets
(especially interior markets) in which it is easier for local firms to find
a spatial niche protected by transport costs. Alternatively, larger
populations also imply higher density, a fact that makes domestic tax
collection easier and tariff revenues less necessary. In either case, the
demand for protection should be lower in such countries, and the
regression might produce a negative coefficient.
> Partner tariffs: measured as a weighted average of the tariff rates in
the trading countries’ markets, the weight being trade volumes, lagged.
Suppose that governments set tariffs in strategic response to trading
partner tariffs, as suggested by Dixit (1987)and Bagwell and Staiger
(2002). Countries might then impose higher tariffs this year if they
faced higher tariffs in their main markets abroad last year.
9 A complete description of the right-hand side variables can be found in appendices to
Clemens and Williamson (2004) and Blattman et al. (2002).
10 In related paper on Latin America involving one of the present authors (Coatsworth and
Williamson 2004a), capital inflows from Britain were added to the analysis for the years 1870-1913.
This variable measured annual British capital exports to potential borrowing countries. Countries
favoured by British lending were shown to have had less need for tariff revenues and thus had lower
tariffs. We do not add the variable here, since our source does not report the period 1914-1938.
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> Effective distance: that is, the distance from each country to either the
United States or the United Kingdom (depending on trade volume),
that distance adjusted by seaborne freight rates specific to that route.
Suppose that governments set tariff rates to protect local firms from
foreign competition. In this case, effective distance may have served as
a substitute for tariffs, so the regression might yield a negative
coefficient.
> Railway mileage: added in kilometres. Suppose again that govern-
ments set tariff rates to protect local firms from foreign competition.
Poor overland transport connections to interior markets serve as a
protective device that might plausibly substitute for tariffs. In this case,
the regression might yield a positive coefficient.
> Urbanisation: taken as share of population in cities and towns greater
than 20,000. Suppose that governments set tariffs in response to the
lobbying power of urban capitalists and artisans in the periphery
(urban workers in import-competing industries rarely had the vote) a`
la Stolper–Samuelson. This might suggest a positive coefficient in the
regressions.
> Tariff autonomy: a dummy variable, taking a value 1 if a country has
the freedom to set its own tariffs independently and 0 otherwise (see
Table 1). Suppose plausibly that countries forced to set tariff rates
preferred by their trading partners set those rates lower than other
countries. This might suggest a positive coefficient.
> Inflation and inflation-squared: the rates in home markets. Suppose
that countries rely to some degree on specific duties and face menu
costs of changing them as goods prices shift. This might suggest a
negative coefficient. However, very rapid inflation might well have
triggered a speedier legislative reaction with increases in specific
duties, thus yielding a positive and offsetting coefficient on the squared
term in the regression.
All of the signs on the regression coefficients in Table 5 are consistent
with prediction and are mostly though not always statistically precise. The
coefficient of determination is likewise high for all specifications.
Yet again, these coefficients cannot be given a strictly causal interpreta-
tion. Many interlocking pathways of causation could be at work among the
variables in these regressions. For example: if tariffs have a causal effect on
GDP per capita or on exports (this last through a direct effect on imports
coupled with a balance of payments mechanism linking imports and
exports). In columns (4) through (6), these variables are piecewise dropped
from the regression. The other coefficient estimates change little, with the
exception of schooling. This is suggestive but not definitive evidence that
reverse causation from income or exports to tariffs may not be primarily
responsible for the broad pattern of coefficients in the initial regressions.
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This certainly does not settle the question of which variables in the regres-
sion cause which others, in which direction and with which magnitudes.
Combined, variance in the regressors of Table 5 explains 65-78 per cent of
variance in the world cross-sectional tariff before 1914. What about the
differences between Latin America and Asia? The first six columns of Table 6
are simply the coefficient estimates from Table 5, reproduced without
modification. The next two columns give the average values of each regressor
in both Latin America and Asia, in natural logarithms; at the bottom, the
same values for the regressand are shown. Of particular note is the similarity
of the figures for effective distance, an average of physical distance to the top
five trading partners weighted by exports sent to that partner, multiplied by
an index of transportation costs. Asia may have been farther away from the
core, but it was doing more intra-regional trading than Latin America. Latin
America had a notably higher share of exports in GDP, a much smaller
average population, much more railway penetration and a much greater
degree of tariff autonomy. It was also richer, more schooled, more urban,
faced higher tariffs abroad and underwent much higher rates of inflation.
The final six columns are a linear combination of the previous columns.
The result is an estimate of the relative contribution of each variable’s
association with tariffs in explaining the much higher pre-1914 tariffs in
Latin America compared with Asia. It is calculated in the following way.
First, we take the difference between the average regressor value in Latin
America and its value in Asia, from columns (7) and (8). Second, this difference
is multiplied by the corresponding coefficient from the first six columns. Third,
this number is divided by the average difference ln(Own Tariff) between the
two regions during this period (the last row of columns (7) and (8)). For the
resulting ratio d, a value of zero means that inter-regional differences in that
regressor have no partial correlation with inter-regional differences in tariffs. A
negative value indicates that inter-regional differences in that regressor have a
partial correlation with lower tariffs in Latin America than in Asia, ceteris
paribus. For substantial correlates of the broadly higher tariffs in Asia, we are
looking for large positive values in those last two columns.
There are five variables whose differences accord strongly with both
worldwide correlations between tariffs and country traits, and with the large
observed tariff differential between the regions11. These are population size,
railroad penetration, urbanisation, partner tariffs and tariff autonomy.
This pattern in the data accords with, though it does not definitively test,
classes of theory that have been important in the literature. Start with the
11 On the other hand, some potential explanations for the difference is not easily corroborated
by these numbers. The export share in GDP and GDP per capita were higher in Latin America than
in Asia, which does not accord with the observed tariff differential between the regions. Differences
in effective distance or schooling rates also do not accord with the inter-regional difference. The
relative importance of the remaining five variables listed in the text are not affected by the inclusion
or omission of inflation, nor are they affected by the exclusion of GDP per capita and export share.
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TABLE 6
WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN TARIFFS BETWEEN LATIN AMERICA AND ASIA BEFORE 1914?
Average regressor
values:
Fraction of regional difference
explained:
Coefficient estimates from Table 5 Latin America Asia d ¼ Coeff:ðL:Am: avg:Asia avg:ÞðL:Am: tariffAsia tariffÞ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) (20) (30) (40) (50) (60)
ln(Exports/GDP) 20.398 20.195 20.384 20.410 21.94 22.96 20.28 20.14 20.27 20.29
ln(GDP/capita) 20.421 20.524 20.506 20.533 7.16 6.59 20.17 20.21 20.20 20.21
ln(Population) 20.477 20.430 20.612 20.384 20.605 20.359 8.18 10.0 0.62 0.56 0.79 0.50 0.78 0.46
ln(Partner tariff) 0.436 0.505 0.445 0.407 0.438 0.397 2.71 2.14 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16
ln(Effective
Dist.)
0.086 0.141 20.059 0.029 20.092 0.001 8.09 7.99 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 20.01 0.00
ln(Railway
miles)
0.190 0.141 0.386 0.227 0.388 0.219 7.20 5.72 0.20 0.15 0.40 0.23 0.40 0.23
ln(Schooling) 20.117 0.097 20.264 20.037 20.475 20.244 6.96 6.11 20.07 0.06 20.16 20.02 20.28 20.14
ln(Urbanization) 0.174 0.082 0.292 0.138 0.239 0.070 4.55 3.94 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.03
Tariff autonomy 0.760 0.618 0.912 0.795 0.843 0.713 0.918 0.211 0.37 0.30 0.45 0.39 0.41 0.35
Inflation 20.030 0.034 20.037 0.030 2.06 0.486 20.03 0.04 20.04 0.03
Inflation squared 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 96.9 224 20.27 20.18 20.27 20.18
ln(Own Tariff) 3.24 1.80
Notes: Coefficient estimates in columns (1) through (6) are taken directly from Table 5. Columns (7) and (8) show the average value of the underlying
regressor before 1914 in Latin America and Asia, respectively, where Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, and
Uruguay and Asia includes Burma, China, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Siam and Turkey. Columns (10) through (60) take
the difference between columns (7) and (8), multiply this difference by the corresponding coefficient from one of the first six columns and divide by the
difference between average ln(Own Tariff) in Latin America and average ln(Own Tariff) in Asia. This value d can be interpreted as the fraction of the
difference between the two regions’ tariffs that is explained by each regressor. Since tariffs were higher in Latin America, a negative value of d suggests
that the regressor cannot explain the observed difference; a large positive value suggests it can.
The italics are to show that these are a different kind of number from the numbers in the other columns.
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first three variables, saving tariff autonomy and partner tariffs for last. Asia’s
enormous populations provided gargantuan internal markets in which pro-
ducers could exploit specialisation and scale. Large internal markets tended
to diminish the need for tariffs to protect import-competing producers. Latin
America’s exploding railroad network certainly increased export sector
access to foreign markets, but it also exposed interior producers to more
foreign competition, encouraging a tariff backlash to offset the impact of the
railroads. The railroad system was less extensive in Asia, and in fact we have
measured it in a fashion that understates the Asian railroad shortfall (miles
of railway trunk line, rather than miles per capita). A less extensive railway
system in Asia implied less need for tariffs for protective purposes. It is also
argued that Asian railroads were built primarily to foster exports, illustrated
by Hurd’s (1975) study of India.
Higher levels of urbanisation in Latin America also accord with the gap in
tariff rates between Latin America and Asia under these partial correlations.
Rogowski (1989) has used the Stolper–Samuelson theorem to suggest that
we look to Latin American urban capitalists for the political economy
explanation for those extraordinarily high tariffs during the belle e´poque.
Although their economies certainly varied in labour scarcity, every Latin
American country faced relative capital scarcity and relative land abundance.
As the Stolper–Samuelson theorem has it, «protection benefits (and liberal-
ization of trade harms) owners of factors in which, relative to the rest of the
world, that society is poorly endowed» (Rogowski 1989, p. 3). According to
this kind of thinking, urban capitalists should have been looking to form
protectionist coalitions as soon as the Latin American belle e´poque and the
pax britannica globalisation forces began to threaten them with freer trade.
High urbanisation rates in Latin America gave these interests more power to
achieve protection, while low rates in Asia contributed to the opposite result.
Even controlling for so many other factors, tariff autonomy is still associated
with higher tariffs. How much did it matter? After all, we have seen a variety of
tariff rates even within colonies run by imperialists favouring free trade at home.
Yet, policy autonomy implied high tariffs before WW1, with the coefficient on the
autonomy variable in the regressions ranging between 0.618 and 0.912 in col-
umns (1) through (6). The model suggests, then, that tariff autonomy might have
been associated with higher tariffs by a factor of 1.7-2.5, all else equal12. That is,
tariff autonomy per se for late 19th century Asia is predicted to correlate with an
increase in average Asian tariffs from 7 to 17 per cent. Turning to columns (10)
through (60), we see that Asia’s lack of tariff autonomy accounts for about one-
third of the tariff difference between Asia and Latin America. However, that
leaves almost two-thirds associated with factors other than tariff autonomy.
Did the Asian countries subjected to unequal treaties, but not formally
colonies (China, Japan and Siam), have higher tariffs than those that were
12 Since the dependent variable is in logs, 0.6183 2.725 1.68 and 0.9123 2.725 2.48.
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colonies (Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and the Philippines)? Surpris-
ingly, they did not, as Figure 3 documents.
With policy autonomy, moving naively along these partial correlations,
hypothetical Asian tariff levels might have been half those of Latin America,
rather than only a fourth. However, as we have seen, tariff autonomy was not
the only variable showing important associations with tariffs. Internal mar-
ket size and the protection of the market that poor railroads offered domestic
producers appear to correlate with lower tariffs. Weak political power of the
Asian urban capitalist may also have mattered, a weakness associated with
smaller urban presence there compared with Latin America, though the urba-
nisation proxy used here could well correlate with other competing factors.
Finally, after controlling for tariff autonomy, partner tariffs correlate strongly
with own tariffs. If your trading partner had high tariffs, so did you. Latin
America traded more with protectionist North America, whereas Asia traded
more with free trade Europe (especially its free trade colonisers Britain and the
Netherlands). This suggests an interesting candidate to further explain the tariff
gap between the regions, though it by no means settles the issue.
We cannot leave this section without saying a word about historical per-
sistence, especially in the case of Latin America. Table 5 covers the four decades
after 1870, but what about the half century before? Does it seem to matter that
this post-independence period was extremely violent in Latin America?
Customs duties, relative to other sources of revenue, are an inexpensive
way to finance rising central government expenditures on infrastructure and
defence. It is plausible that there might be greater reliance on tariffs than on
other sources of revenue in young, recently independent economies with few
bureaucratic resources to implement efficient collection, limited access to
foreign capital markets, more enemies and no imperialist protection from
them. This was certainly true of the newly independent United States and
Latin American countries in the first half of the 19th century, although the
United States had more success in gaining access to European capital mar-
kets. As Centeno (1997, Table 1) has shown, the average share of customs
duties in total revenues across eleven Latin American republics was 57.8 per cent
between 1820 and 1890. Furthermore, customs revenues are especially
important for land-abundant countries with federal governments since they
do not have the population and taxpayer density to make other forms of tax
collection efficient13. Finally, there was a huge revenue need to bankroll
armed conflict in the United States of the 1860s and the newly independent
Latin American republics between the 1820s and the 1870s (see Centeno
1997; Mares 2001; Bates et al. 2007).
The preoccupation with national defence and internal security pushed the
newly independent Latin American republics towards higher revenue-generating
13 For federal governments, customs revenues were even bigger share of total revenues in Latin
America (65.6 per cent).
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tariffs. Centeno (1997) documents that military expenditures quickly rose to
consume over 70 per cent and often more than 90 per cent of all revenues. Weak
governments, under attack from within and without, abandoned internal taxes
that required an extensive and loyal bureaucracy to collect and concentrated
instead on tax collection at a few ports and mines. Thus, levels of tariff pro-
tection rose in every Latin American country (for which there are data) as did
the customs revenues as a percentage of total government revenues.
We stress these facts since we believe that historical persistence matters,
and that some part of those very high Latin American tariffs between 1870
and WW1, can be explained by the level of violence in the half century before
1870, violence so particular to Latin America during what was otherwise a
pax britannica world.
7. WHAT EXPLAINS THE INTERWAR RISE IN ASIAN PROTECTION?
Why did Asian tariffs rise to those high Latin American heights during the
interwar years, especially during the 1930s? Note that it was not just one or
two Asian countries pushing those tariffs up, since Figure 7 shows that it was
ubiquitous across the whole region. Only Japan and the Philippines failed to
raise tariffs in the 1930s. But every other Asian country did so in both dec-
ades, with the biggest tariff surge taking place for Burma, Ceylon, China,
India and Siam (Thailand). What was different about the interwar decades?
Table 7 repeats for the interwar decades the same regressions reported in
Table 5 for the pre-WWI decades. The comparison is striking: the coefficients
on all the correlates of tariff levels are broadly similar to those before 1914,
except one: tariff autonomy. While countries with tariff autonomy had much
higher tariffs before WW1, all else equal, they did not thereafter. This sug-
gests that the American and European hegemons may have released their
grip on their colonies and dependent partners in the interwar years14.
Table 8 offers further evidence of the loosening colonial grip. The first
row of the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition reports the portion of the differ-
ence in log tariffs between Asia and Latin America due to differences in the
value of the right-hand side variables, the second due to the difference in the
coefficients between the two regions, while the third due to both differences
at once (interaction). The table confirms what we suggested above: for the
1930s, we cannot reject the hypothesis that all three of these components are
zero, meaning that the ability of our endogenous tariff model to meaningfully
decompose the correlates of tariff differences between the two regions falls
apart in the 1930s (the residual goes way up). Even for the interwar as a
14 We need to know why their colonial grip weakened in the 1920s, thus allowing the Asian
colonies to raise their tariffs to such heights. Surely financial exhaustion resulting from the Great
War between the European colonists is one explanation, but there are likely to be others as well.
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whole, it appears that differences in the regressors (e.g. autonomy) are not
associated with the regional tariff gap any more, but rather that differences
in how the regressors are associated with tariffs (the coefficients) matter
much more.
It seems to us that the moral is this: if we are looking for the historical
origins of inward-looking and anti-market ISI strategies in much of Asia
during the post-WW2 period, we should start looking at the interwar transition
of the colonies and dependents to policy autonomy, not just in their response
to the global crisis of the 1930s. As for the historical origins of the post-WW2
ISI anti-global and anti-market strategies in Latin America, we need not
look farther than the very high tariffs that prevailed there over the century
before 1950.
8. DID TARIFF POLICY INFLUENCE INDUSTRIALISATION IN LATIN
AMERICA AND ASIA?
In some parts of Latin America and Asia, modern industrialisation started
more than a century ago. Latin America had two emerging industrial leaders
in the late 19th century (Brazil and Mexico), Asia had four (Bengal, Bombay,
FIGURE 7
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TABLE 7
WHY WERE TARIFFS HIGHER IN LATIN AMERICA THAN IN ASIA IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
Dependent variable: ln(Own Tariff)1
Sample: 35 countries2, 1919-1938
Panel between effects estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables lntariff lntariff lntariff lntariff lntariff lntariff
ln(Exports/GDP) 20.215 20.262* 20.179 20.153
(1.591) (1.906) (1.281) (0.966)
ln(GDP/capita3) 20.620*** 20.659*** 20.608** 20.589**
(2.861) (2.967) (2.782) (2.666)
ln(Population) 20.473*** 20.491*** 20.446*** 20.333*** 20.399*** 20.304***
(4.062) (4.036) (3.719) (4.038) (2.971) (3.332)
ln(Partner Tariff4) 0.615* 0.698* 0.827** 0.718** 0.873** 0.779*
(1.748) (2.031) (2.378) (2.102) (2.222) (2.049)
ln(Effective Dist5) 0.0421 0.0385 0.0452 0.0828 20.0118 0.0219
(0.470) (0.404) (0.489) (0.934) (0.116) (0.229)
ln(Railway Miles6) 0.378*** 0.384*** 0.344*** 0.282*** 0.302** 0.250**
(4.057) (3.909) (3.522) (3.282) (2.763) (2.632)
ln(Schooling7) 20.296 20.234 20.213 20.197 20.589*** 20.565***
(1.428) (1.134) (1.058) (0.966) (3.479) (3.378)
ln(Urbanization8) 0.290* 0.275* 0.219 0.168 0.0975 0.0570
(1.902) (1.744) (1.373) (1.073) (0.561) (0.339)
Tariff Autonomy9 20.0605 20.103 20.0516 0.158 20.103 0.0780
(0.210) (0.343) (0.177) (0.647) (0.312) (0.289)
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TABLE 7 (Cont.)
Dependent variable: ln(Own Tariff)1
Sample: 35 countries2, 1919-1938
Panel between effects estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables lntariff lntariff lntariff lntariff lntariff lntariff
Inflation 0.00423 0.00503* 0.00452 0.00520*
(1.696) (2.056) (1.602) (1.905)
Inflation squared 22.98e–06 23.46e–06 22.61e–06 23.04e–06
(1.066) (1.234) (0.827) (0.972)
Constant 7.078*** 6.841*** 6.252*** 5.932*** 5.530*** 5.276***
(4.609) (4.368) (4.040) (3.834) (3.203) (3.096)
Observations 604 585 585 585 585 585
R2 0.630 0.604 0.659 0.635 0.544 0.527
Number of country 35 35 35 35 35 35
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics is in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
*Significant at 10%.
**Significant at 5%.
***Significant at 1%.
1Import duties over imports.
2Argentina, Australia, Austria–Hungary, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States and Uruguay.
3In 1990 US$.
4Index of average tariff levels in top five trading partners weighted by exports going to that partner.
5Product of average physical distance to top five trading partners (principal city to principal city) weighted by exports going to that country, and
transportation cost index.
6Miles of railway trunk line in country.
7Fraction of the population below the age of fifteen that is enrolled in primary school.
8Fraction of the population living in agglomerations of greater than 50,000 people.
9Indicator variable taking the value 1 if country has the freedom to set own tariff levels independently, or 0 if it does not.
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Japan and Shanghai) and the European periphery had at least three (Cata-
lonia, the north Italian triangle and Russia). Why did Asian and Latin
American industrialisation start in the late 19th century and why in some
places and not in others? Undoubtedly, the answer is as complex as any
question dealing more generally with the causes of modern economic
growth, and certainly any answer should include the much-cited funda-
mentals like culture, geography, institutions and good or bad government.
And certainly those fundamentals would help explain any manufacturing
productivity catch-up (or its absence) in Latin America and Asia. However, as
to timing and magnitudes, here global forces have a chance to shine. What
role did tariffs play? What role did world market forces play?
The economics literature suggests five possible explanations, but that
literature is just starting to offer an empirical assessment of their importance
between 1870 and 1940 (see Williamson 2011b). The big five are:
> Trade barriers: higher tariffs and non-tariff barriers must have
reduced competitive pressure on local import-competing manufactur-
ing, in effect by raising the price of their output in domestic markets.
TABLE 8
OAXACA–BLINDER DECOMPOSITION OF LN(OWN TARIFF), LATIN AMERICA AND
ASIA
1870-1913 and
1919-1938 1870-1913 1919-1938
1931-
1938
ln(own tariff)Lat. Am. – ln(own
tariff)Asia
1.040 1.375 0.537 0.161
Standard error of difference 0.035 0.036 0.062 0.083
Three-fold decomposition
Regressor values 0.764*** 0.980*** 0.010 20.342
(0.077) (0.098) (0.188) (0.218)
Coefficients 0.471*** 0.461*** 0.578*** 0.067
(0.113) (0.156) (0.145) (0.217)
Interaction 20.195 20.066 20.051 0.436
(0.132) (0.181) (0.229) (0.298)
N in Latin America 476 286 151 72
N in Asia 525 359 166 70
N total 1,001 645 317 142
Note: Regressors are the same as in Table 6, column 3.
*P, 0.1.
**P, 0.05.
***P, 0.01.
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NTBs should include real exchange rate manipulation and the great
depreciations during the interwar decades. In contrast, falling
transportation costs across sea lanes (effective distance) would have
increased competitive pressure on home manufacturing, and railroad
development (railway mileage per land area) would have done the
same by exposing internal markets to more foreign competition. How
big were those effects, and was tariff and exchange rate policy the most
important of them?
> Terms of trade and world markets: a secular rise in primary product
prices may foster an export boom in the poor periphery — as well as a
GDP per capita gain — but it will also cause de-industrialisation. The
19th century offers abundant evidence confirming this effect, whether
for India, Mexico or the Ottoman Empire15. However, if a primary
product export price boom fostered de-industrialisation in the poor
periphery, the secular export price slump between the 1870s and 1890s
and the 1930s16 should have fostered industrialisation there as well.
> Wage costs: as the poor periphery fell further behind the fast-growing
industrial core up to WW1 — what we now call the Great Divergence —
wage costs per unit of labour fell in the poor periphery relative to the
industrial core. Furthermore, since, without the role of trade barriers,
manufacturing prices were similar the world around, the own wage in
manufacturing (the nominal wage divided by the price of manufacturing
output) must also have fallen in the poor periphery relative to the rich
industrial core. This rising gap should have given the poor periphery an
increasing cost advantage in their domestic markets, ceteris paribus,
fostering industrialisation, led by labour-intensive manufacturing.
> Fuel and intermediate input costs: textile manufacturing needs
cotton, wool, flax and silk intermediates, but many countries do not
grow some or any of them. Metal manufacturing needs ores, but many
countries do not mine them. Since these are high bulk, low-value
products, they were expensive to ship long distance in 1870; however,
transport revolutions had lowered those costs dramatically by 1940.
Manufacturing in natural resource scarce countries in the poor
periphery must have benefited by global market integration much
more than did the resource-abundant industrial leaders. In addition,
modern steam-driven power in industry needed cheap fuel. Those
without coal to mine or oil to pump suffered severe competitive
disadvantage in 1870, but that disadvantage had almost evaporated for
any poor periphery country without coal or oil reserves in the more
global world of 1940 when they could import the stuff cheaply.
15 For India, see Clingingsmith and Williamson (2008), for Mexico, see Dobado et al. (2008) and
for the Ottoman Empire, see Pamuk and Williamson (2011).
16 As famously noted by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950). See also Williamson (2008, 2011b).
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> Productivity catch-up: given wage, fuel and intermediate costs, given
world market conditions and given tariff policy, productivity catch-up
of domestic manufacturing on the industrial leaders should surely have
fostered industrialisation in the poor periphery. This, one supposes, is
where the role of pro-growth institutions and good government should
shine.
While these are the big five, any future analysis should also control for
domestic market size and the level of human capital — required more
intensively in manufacturing than in primary product production — as well
as whether the country was a colony — and thus whether it had autonomy
over other than just tariff policy. Other forces might include whether parts of
interwar Asia were mimicking pro-industrial policies in emerging industrial
new comers like Brazil, Mexico and Russia/USSR.
9. CONCLUDING REMARK
Are there lessons from history here? Perhaps, but we prefer to end instead
with the following challenge: any claim that liberal trade policy lies at the
heart of recent growth performance in these two regions must also explain
why high tariffs did not dampen growth or industrialisation during the Latin
American belle e´poque and why low tariffs did not ignite growth or indus-
trialisation in Asia before 1914.
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